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THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT AT SIXTY: SHAREHOLDERS AND
THEIR INFLUENCE
LISA M. FAIRFAX*
I
INTRODUCTION
In the sixty years since the Committee on Corporate Laws (Committee)
promulgated the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), there have been
significant changes in corporate law and corporate governance.1 One such
change has been an increase in shareholder activism aimed at enhancing
shareholders’ voting power and influence over corporate affairs.2
Such increased shareholder activism (along with its potential for increase in
shareholder power) has sparked considerable debate. Advocates of increasing
shareholder power insist that augmenting shareholders’ voting rights and
influence over corporate affairs is vital not only for ensuring board and
managerial accountability, but also for curbing fraud and other forms of
misbehavior.3 Corporate-governance scandals involving entities such as Enron
and American International Group (AIG), as well as the recent financial
meltdown,4 have spurred efforts to enhance shareholder power because they
highlight the need for greater accountability and improved safeguards against
corporate malfeasance. Opponents contend that increasing shareholder power
inappropriately shifts the balance of power away from boards.5 In their view,

Copyright © 2011 by Lisa M. Fairfax.
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law, George Washington University School
of Law. Special thanks to Jim Cox for organizing this symposium edition.
1. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT introductory note xii–xxv (2007) (describing major amendments
to the MBCA); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes but
Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 353–63 (2000) (describing substantial changes in corporate
governance from 1950—the year of the enactment of the MBCA—to 2000).
2. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1288–1303
(2009) (describing recent shareholder activism and its impact); RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2007
POSTSEASON REPORT: A CLOSER LOOK AT ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT 5–7 (2007)
[hereinafter 2007 POSTSEASON REPORT].
3. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
861 (2005).
4. See Steven Davidoff & David Zaring, Big Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial
Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 465 (2009) (discussing the financial crisis).
5. See Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1735, 1754 (2005).
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such a shift undermines directors’ ability to act independently or otherwise
consider the interests of all shareholders and corporate constituents, while
increasing the pressure on boards to focus on short-term financial results.6
Opponents also insist that such a shift inappropriately enhances the power of
shareholders with special or narrow agendas who may advance their personal
interests at the expense of the broader shareholder class.7 In many respects, the
debate regarding the propriety of shareholder activism and increased
shareholder power has been as intense as shareholder activism itself.
Importantly, however, shareholder activism has culminated in considerable
corporate-governance changes that challenge the board-centric model of
corporate governance embedded in the MBCA.8 These changes likely reflect a
permanent shift in the dynamics between boards and shareholders.9 Although
the impact of that shift is not clear, it is clear that the MBCA must take account
of that shift, and provide guidance for corporations seeking to determine how
best to allocate power between shareholders and directors. Hopefully, the next
sixty years will reflect such guidance.
II
THE “NEW” SHAREHOLDERS AND THEIR RISE TO INFLUENCE
A. The Changing Shareholder Landscape
It is difficult to properly appreciate increased shareholder activism without
first appreciating the changes in the shareholder landscape that have occurred
over the last sixty years. Ultimately, changes in shareholder composition have
facilitated and accelerated shareholder activism and the resulting changes in the
corporate-governance landscape.
Perhaps the most noteworthy change with regard to shareholder
composition has been the sharp growth of the institutional investor over the last
sixty years. In 1950, institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds,
and insurance companies, owned less than 10% of the total U.S. equity
market.10 Institutional investors owned about 66% of the total U.S. equity
market by 2006, and such investors owned more than 76% of the equity at the

6. See id. at 1746; Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 906–18 (considering, but rebutting, the concern that
increased shareholder power negatively impacts the rights of other stakeholders).
7. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561, 577 (2006); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1754.
8. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2008).
9. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1041–42 (2010).
10. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 353 (describing the principal U.S. institutional investors as
pension funds, investment companies including mutual funds and closed-end funds, insurance
companies, private foundations, endowments, securities firms, and private investment vehicles such as
LBO funds and hedge funds).
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largest 1000 companies by the end of 2007.11 By contrast, the percentage of
public stock held by retail investors has fallen dramatically over the last sixty
years. Thus, the percentage of stock held by households and nonprofits, which
include individual investors and those who hold large share blocks, declined
from 78% in 1970 to 36% in 2008.12 Clearly, one of the more noteworthy
changes since 1950 has been the rise in institutional ownership coupled with the
decline in retail stock ownership.
This change has a significant impact on shareholders’ ability to influence
corporate affairs. Indeed, the concentration of institutional ownership has the
potential to overcome the collective-action problems posed by the traditional
pool of dispersed retail investors.13 As a result, that ownership enhances
institutional investors’ ability to communicate with the board and with one
another, thereby enhancing their potential ability to influence corporate affairs.
To be sure, other factors may limit this ability.14 Nevertheless, the rise of the
institutional investor opens the door for shareholders to engage in greater
activism and ultimately exercise greater power over the corporation.
One institutional investor that has taken advantage of this door opening has
been the hedge fund. Virtually unheard of in 1950, hedge funds have risen to
prominence over the last few years. The lack of regulation over hedge funds
makes it difficult to pinpoint the precise percentage of the equity market held
by hedge funds.15 However, available data reveals that hedge funds currently
control more than one trillion dollars in assets.16 Moreover, hedge-fund activism
has risen dramatically. Hedge funds have powerful incentives to generate
positive returns, coupled with a freedom from regulatory and structural barriers
that hamper other institutional investors.17 As a result, engaging in activism is
both easier and more desirable for hedge funds. To be sure, not all hedge funds
engage in activism; but those that do engage tend to wield substantial influence
over their targeted corporations.18 Hedge-fund growth and activism, therefore,
11. See The Conference Board, U.S. Institutional Investors Boost Ownership of U.S. Corporations
to New High (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Institutional+investors+boost+ownership+
of+U.S.+corps+to+new+highs-a01611670934.
12. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 996.
13. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties of Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1275–76 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 532–67
(pinpointing legal rules and legal risks that hamper shareholder action), 575–84 (1990) (discussing
collective actions problems and ways to surmount such problems); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 452 (1991) (noting
agency costs associated with institutional investor activism that may undermine fundamental change).
15. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 13, at 1279; Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 997.
16. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 13, at 1279; Kahn & Rock, supra note 9, at 997.
17. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 13, at 1278; Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1734–36 (2008).
18. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 13, at 1278; Brav et al., supra note 17, at 1234–36; see also
Frank S. Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation 5
(Brookings-Nomura Papers on Fin. Servs., Working Paper Mp. 06–21, 2006), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=931254.
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has contributed considerably to the shifting balance of power within the
corporation.
Another important development in the shareholder landscape has been the
growth of proxy advisory firms.19 Among other things, such firms advise
institutional investors on voting matters.20 There is extensive debate regarding
whether and to what extent proxy advisory firms influence corporate voting.21
However, at the very least, such firms facilitate shareholders’ ability to
influence corporate affairs by coordinating the voting efforts and policies of
large institutional investors.22 Hence, these firms represent an important
component of the changed corporate-governance landscape.
Ultimately, each component of that changed landscape serves to enhance
shareholders’ potential to wield influence in the corporate arena. As the next
part reveals, in recent years, many shareholders have transformed that potential
into reality.
B. Shareholders and Their Enhanced Voting Power
Over the last decade, shareholders have engaged in a variety of efforts
aimed at increasing their influence over the corporation. This part analyzes
some of the core campaigns.
1. Majority Voting
One of the most successful shareholder activists’ campaigns in recent years
has been the effort to implement majority voting. Until recently, virtually all
U.S. corporations employed a plurality voting system, pursuant to which a
director was elected so long as she received a plurality of the votes cast.23 In an
uncontested election, such a system meant that a director could be elected so
long as she received one vote cast in her favor, without regard to votes that are
withheld or cast against her.24 Over the past several years, shareholder activists
have waged an aggressive campaign to substitute the plurality system for a
majority-vote regime whereby a director cannot be elected without receiving a
majority of votes cast in her favor. Not only have shareholders submitted an
increasing number of majority-vote shareholder proposals,25 but those proposals

19. See Tamara Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for
Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 427–29 (2009); Stephen J. Choi et al.,
Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 650–60 (2009).
20. See Belinfanti, supra note 19, at 427–49; Choi et al., supra note 19, at 650–60.
21. See Choi et al., supra note 19, at 657.
22. See Belinfanti, supra note 19, at 397–402.
23. See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, NEAL, GERBER &
EISENBERG LLP, ii (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy111207.pdf.
24. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 n.52 (proposed Oct. 23,
2003); J.W. Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot
Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1010 (2007).
25. In 2006 and 2007, shareholders submitted more than 150 majority voting proposals. See 2007
POSTSEASON REPORT, supra note 2, at 16. By contrast, only twelve majority vote proposals were
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have consistently averaged near fifty percent shareholder support.26 More
importantly, corporations have begun implementing some form of majorityvote regime in record numbers. Hence, while fewer than thirty companies had a
majority-vote regime in 2005,27 by 2008, 72% of S&P 500 companies and 62% of
Fortune 500 companies had adopted some form of majority voting.28 Corporategovernance experts predict that majority voting will soon be the most dominant
election standard.29
Shareholder activists contend that majority voting enables shareholders to
truly impact election outcomes. Because voting for directors is one of the
primary mechanisms for shareholders to influence corporate affairs, the ability
to vote also encompasses the ability to impact corporate behavior and to
potentially hold corporate actors accountable for misbehavior. To be sure,
factors such as the holdover rule and the potential for failed elections may mute
the impact of majority voting.30 Nevertheless, the virtual sea-change in the
director election standard has the potential to significantly influence the power
dynamics between shareholders and directors.
2. Broker Voting
In July of 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to
eliminate broker discretionary voting for uncontested director elections. Under
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 452, brokers were permitted to vote
shares in their control for “routine matters” if brokers did not receive voting
instructions from the beneficial holders by the tenth day preceding a
shareholder meeting.31 The SEC voted to eliminate uncontested elections from
those matters classified as “routine,” and hence brokers can no longer cast votes
for uninstructed shares in such elections.32 The change went into effect at the
beginning of 2010. In July 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street

submitted in 2004. See Stephen Taub, Investors Back Shareholder Resolutions, CFO.COM (Aug. 22,
2006), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7826000?f=search.
26. See 2007 POSTSEASON REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
27. See Brooke A. Masters, Proxy Measures Pushing Corporate Accountability Gain Support,
WASH. POST, June 17, 2006, at D1.
28. Claudia Allen, Majority Voting and the 2008 Proxy Season, at 4, available at http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/professionaled/documents/archive/Garrett/2008/Issues2008ProxySeason_
ClaudiaAllen.pdf; see also Allen, supra note 23, at iii (revealing that at the start of the 2008 proxy
season, 66% of S&P 500 companies, and 57% of Fortune 500 companies had some form of majority
voting).
29. See Arthur Fleischer, Majority Voting and Shareholder Access, 1636 PLI/Corp 313, 317 (Nov.
7, 2007) (“Majority voting is clearly becoming the norm in United States corporations.”); Martin
Lipton, What Directors Can Expect in the New Year, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Jan. 3, 2006), http://
www.complianceweek.com/article/2161/what-directors-can-expect-in-the-new-year.
30. See Fairfax, supra note 2, at 1296–1300; William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority
Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 487–89 (2007).
31. See Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 2009 WL 1897466, at 2 n.7 (July 1, 2009), available at
http://sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf; see also NYSE, Inc. Rule 452 (2009), available at http://
rules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_5&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/.
32. See Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, supra note 31.
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). The Dodd-Frank
Act not only codified this change, but also extended it, directing that all
national securities exchanges prohibit broker discretionary voting in
uncontested elections.33
This altered rule could substantially affect shareholders’ ability to influence
corporate affairs. In 2006, a NYSE working group found that broker voting
invariably follows management recommendation, and hence, influences election
outcomes in favor of management, particularly during elections where
shareholders have organized a “vote no” or a “withhold the vote” campaign.34
The amended Rule 452, coupled with the directive from the Dodd-Frank Act
for all other exchanges, could reverse or counteract this influence. The changes
in broker voting also may make it more difficult for directors to receive a
majority vote, especially when shareholders target those directors.35 If the
changes in broker voting make it more difficult for directors to receive a
majority vote, such changes could enhance shareholder power even in the
context of elections that fall short of a full-blown proxy contest.
3. Staggered Boards
Shareholders also have experienced success in their campaign to abolish
staggered boards—boards in which only a portion of directors are elected each
year. While there may be legitimate reasons for maintaining staggered boards,
their existence hinders shareholders’ ability to replace a majority of the board.
For this reason, shareholder activists view staggered boards as a form of
managerial entrenchment and have sought to eliminate such boards since the
1980s.36 Although shareholder proposals seeking such elimination have
averaged well over fifty percent shareholder support since 2000, this kind of
support did not prompt most corporations to alter their board structure in the
early part of the decade.37 More recently, however, this phenomenon has
changed. Thus, in 2007, directors at a majority of S&P 500 companies were
elected annually.38 Moreover, between 2003 and 2009, two-thirds of companies
with staggered boards had eliminated them.39 Like majority voting, the
elimination of staggered boards has the potential to greatly enhance
shareholders’ ability to influence election outcomes, and hence to sway
corporate affairs.

33. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 957,
124 Stat. 1376, 1906–07 (2010).
34. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE 14 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf.
35. See id. at 12–13. The rule could also make it difficult for some corporations to meet the quorum
requirements. See id. at 12.
36. See Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 852.
37. See id. at 852–54 (noting that more than sixty percent of corporations had failed to declassify
their boards despite majority support for such declassification).
38. See 2007 POSTSEASON REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
39. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1009.
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4. Proxy Fights
In recent years not only has there been an increase in proxy fights, but there
also has been an increase in the relative success of such fights. Thus, from 2001
through 2005, there was an average of 61 proxy fights, with a 45% success rate,
with success defined as shareholder activists obtaining at least one contested
board seat.40 By contrast, there were 100 such fights in 2006 and 107 in 2007,
with a 57% and 50% success rate respectively.41 In 2009, there were a record 133
proxy fights.42 While many of those fights resulted in success via settlement,
shareholder activists also achieved success in 60% of the proxy fights that went
to an actual vote in 2009.43 Currently, it appears that proxy fights have
declined.44 However, shareholder activists’ success in proxy fights waged over
the last few years underscores shareholders’ greater influence, and highlights
their enhanced ability to shape and even control the corporate agenda and
corporate decision-making.
5. Proxy Access
Many shareholder activists perceive proxy access—the ability to nominate
candidates of their choice on the corporation’s proxy statement—as
indispensable to their shareholder-empowerment efforts. Currently, only
management-supported candidates appear on the corporate ballot.45 If
shareholders want to nominate candidates, they must solicit shareholders by
creating and distributing their own proxy statement.46 Because of the expense
involved with such a process, shareholders rarely engage in these separate
proxy solicitations—and thus, rarely nominate their own candidates for
director.47 In light of this phenomenon, shareholder activists have been fighting
to obtain proxy access for decades. While there is considerable and intense
debate regarding the benefits and desirability of proxy access, shareholder
activists insist that proxy access will enable them to positively influence
corporate affairs and prevent abuses of power.

40. See Charles Nathan & Dennis Craythorn, The 2009 Proxy Season and the Year of Investor
Anger, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 2008, at 4; In Proxy fights, Odds in Favor of Dissidents, REUTERS (Aug. 23,
2007), http://blogs.reuters.com/reuters-dealzone/2007/08/23/after-all-the-punches-proxy-fights-win-halfthe-time/.
41. See Nathan & Craythorn, supra note 40, at 4.
42. See John Laide, Proxy Fight Season, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (Feb. 4, 2010),
https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=1&pg=/pub/rs_20100204.html&Proxy_
Fight_Season&rnd=284029.
43. See John Laide, Proxy Fight Volume and Success Rates Decline, SHARKREPELLENT.NET (June
4, 2010), https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=1&pg=/pub/rs_20100624.html&&
Proxy_Fight_Volume_and_Success_Rates_Decline&rnd=906184.
44. See id.
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2006).
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2006) (requiring that any solicitation of a proxy be accompanied
by a filed proxy statement).
47. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003).
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On August 25, 2010, for the first time in its history, the SEC approved a
proxy-access regime that not only requires every public company to grant proxy
access to its shareholders, but also allows shareholders to propose additional
mechanisms for gaining access to the company’s proxy statement.48 Under the
new rules, shareholders would be eligible to have their nominees included on
the corporation’s proxy materials if they (1) own at least three percent of the
voting power of a company’s securities, (2) have held such securities
continuously for at least three years and intend to continue such ownership
after the director election, and (3) are not holding the securities in order to
change control of the company or gain board seats that exceed the maximum
number required to be included under the rule.49 In this respect, the final rules
provide that a company is not required to include more than one nominee, or a
number of nominees that would represent up to twenty-five percent of the
company’s board, whichever is greater.50 In addition to mandating proxy access
in this manner, the new rules amend the shareholder-proposal rule to require
that companies include on their proxy statement shareholder proposals
regarding the company’s nomination procedures.51 The SEC made clear that if
shareholders approve any such proposals, they will not supplant the mandated
access rule, but rather will provide an additional route through which
shareholders may obtain access to the corporation’s proxy statement for the
purposes of nominating candidates of their choice.52
According to the SEC, the economic crisis underscored the need for proxy
reform because the crisis raised “serious concerns about the accountability and
responsiveness of some companies and boards of directors to the interests of
shareholders,” as well as concerns regarding how the proxy structure may be
“impeding the ability of shareholders to hold boards accountable.”53 The SEC
stated that the new rules “facilitate the effective exercise of shareholders’
traditional state law rights.”54
Shareholders have fought for proxy access almost since the inception of the
federal proxy rules, and while the SEC has proposed access rules in the past, it

48. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange
Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 2010 WL 3343532, at 9 (Aug.
25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf [hereinafter Final Proxy-Access
Rule].
49. See id. at 24–25.
50. See id. at 26.
51. See id. at 33. This new provision reverses a provision adopted by the SEC in 2007. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2007).
52. See Final Proxy-Access Rule, supra note 48, at 231–32.
53. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046, Exchange
Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 2009 WL 1953653, at 7
(proposed June 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-9046.pdf [hereinafter
2009 Proxy-Access Proposal].
54. See Final Proxy-Access Rule, supra note 48, at 1.
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had previously declined to implement them.55 Hence, this new proxy-access
regime not only represents a historical moment in the SEC’s history, but it also
could significantly impact corporate elections and shareholders’ influence over
those elections. The SEC’s implementation of proxy access clearly solidifies the
56
current corporate-governance shift towards enhanced shareholder power.
III
THE MBCA RESPONDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEXT SIXTY YEARS
As these changes reveal, the corporate-governance landscape has been
altered considerably since 1950. Given the cumulative and significant nature of
those alterations, they are likely to be a permanent fixture of our governance
landscape. How should the MBCA respond to these changes?
On the one hand, some may contend that any changes to the MBCA should
be relatively minimal, and perhaps even non-existent. As an initial matter, the
fact that the MBCA is designed to be an enabling statute means that it is aimed
at facilitating private ordering between directors and shareholders. Significant
changes to the MBCA, particularly those embracing mandated rules, would
undermine the enabling philosophy of the MBCA. Such changes not only may
prevent directors and shareholders from freely choosing the governance scheme
they believe to be most appropriate, but also may increase the possibility that
corporate-governance rules could have both negative and unintended
consequences on the governance structures of public and private companies.57
From this perspective, significant changes to the MBCA may not appear
desirable. Such a perspective therefore counsels against any such changes, even
in response to the apparent growing influence of shareholders.
On the other hand, arguably the changes that already have been made to the
MBCA are sufficient to account for the new governance environment. Some
scholars contend that the very fact that shareholders have managed to gain
greater influence over corporate affairs may obviate the need and even the
desirability for reforms aimed at increasing shareholders’ voting power.58 Thus,
shareholder success through the proposal process may obviate any need for
significant alterations to the MBCA. Moreover, the Committee already has
altered the MBCA in response to shareholder concerns, and those alterations
address two issues that have particularly captured shareholders’ attention. First,

55. See 2009 Proxy-Access Proposal, supra note 53, at 19–26 (discussing previous proposals); see
also Fairfax, supra note 2, at 1273–78.
56. As this article was going to press, the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce filed a court action challenging the SEC’s new proxy rules, and the SEC delayed
implementation of the rules until the challenge has been resolved.
57. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS ON VOTING BY SHAREHOLDERS
FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 16 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/
CL270000pub/directorvoting/20060313000001.pdf (noting potential for unintended consequences in the
contest of changes related to majority voting).
58. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1048.
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the MBCA has been amended to provide for the adoption of provisions that
enable resignation of directors who fail to receive a majority of the vote.59 While
that amendment falls short of a true majority-vote system, it nevertheless
represents an important response to shareholder concerns in this area. Second,
and perhaps most significantly, the MBCA has been altered not only to
facilitate the adoption of proxy-access bylaw provisions, but also to support the
legitimacy of bylaw provisions that provide for reimbursement of proxy
expenses.60 Because the new SEC rule is contingent on the ability of
shareholders to nominate directors under state law,61 these MBCA changes will
be critical to ensuring shareholders’ ability to utilize the proxy-access regime
authorized by the SEC. Given the important weight that shareholders have
placed on the proxy-access issue, these alterations are especially significant,
and, in light of the SEC’s actions with respect to proxy access, may decrease the
need for any further reforms.
Of course, shareholder activists would likely disagree with this assessment,
particularly because although the MBCA is an enabling statute, it is by no
means neutral on the shareholder-power debate. Instead, the MBCA remains
an essentially board-centric statute. In this respect, shareholder activists may
contend that the board-centric nature of the MBCA must continue to be altered
to better reflect or acknowledge shareholders’ increased influence in corporate
affairs. And in fact, there continue to be a host of issues on which shareholders
have focused that could have ramifications in the MBCA.
Perhaps most importantly, the new proxy-access regime may prompt
additional changes to the MBCA. In particular, the MBCA may be able to
provide guidance to shareholders seeking to craft their own access proposal, or
otherwise may be altered to help companies grapple with the thorny issues
raised by proxy-access and shareholder-access proposals. Second, shareholders’
increased focus on the elimination of staggered boards could prompt a desire
for changes to that provision under section 8.06. Such changes could range from
provisions that would enable a default requirement for annual elections to those
that would limit a board’s ability to implement a staggered-board regime. Third,
shareholders’ recent attention to special meetings could mean that they demand

59. See Memorandum from the Comm. on Corporate Laws, Committee on Corporate Laws
Adopts Amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act Relating to Voting By Shareholders for
the Election of Directors, (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/
CL270000pub/nosearch/mbca/amendments/release.pdf [hereinafter Committee Amendments on
Voting] (noting potential for unintended consequences in the contest of changes related to majority
voting).
60. See Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Shareholder Proxy Access Amendments
to Chapters 2 and 10, 64 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1157 (2009). On April 10, 2009, Delaware signed into law
several changes to its corporate code. For the complete set of changes, see Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 112
(2009). Such changes include provisions that clarify shareholders ability to adopt bylaw amendments
related to proxy access and reimbursement of proxy expenses.
61. See Final Proxy-Access Rule, supra note 48, at 38 (noting that a company would not be subject
to the mandated proxy-access rule if state law or the company’s governing documents prohibit
shareholders from nominating candidates to the board of directors).
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some reconsideration of the special-meeting provisions under section 7.02.62
Fourth, there may be some desire to consider potential changes related to
fiduciary responsibilities under section 8.30. In this regard, it is important to
note that increased shareholder power generates concerns for directors and
managers that could implicate the MBCA. In this vein, some have argued that
increased shareholder power should trigger a corresponding increase in
shareholder responsibility.63 Consistent with this argument, increased
shareholder power could have an impact on section 8.30, triggering a
consideration of whether the potential shift in shareholder responsibilities
should generate a shift in shareholder duties and even shareholder liability.
Fifth, increased shareholder power may implicate the disclosure provisions of
the MBCA, especially with respect to the new proxy-access regime. How and to
what extent do directors’ disclosure duties change when shareholder-nominated
candidates become members of the board? If they do not change, is it important
to reiterate or otherwise highlight that lack of change in the MBCA?
Ultimately, there are a variety of ways in which the MBCA may continue to
be affected by the changing corporate-governance environment, and this part
only illustrates a few. It is tempting to resist additional changes to the MBCA.
However, such changes not only may be inevitable, but also may be desirable,
particularly because they may provide the Committee with an opportunity to
comprehensively assess the impact of those changes as well as their
ramifications for other governance issues and provisions within the MBCA.
IV
CONCLUSION
The shifting corporate-governance landscape has promoted a
reconsideration of the power allocation between shareholders and directors. To
be sure, the Committee has been actively engaged in such reconsideration, and
has made important changes to the MBCA. As the Committee has pointed out,
however, such changes must be done both “cautiously and deliberately.”64 More
importantly, any changes must be implemented in a manner that does not
damage the MBCA’s core commitment to advance the best interests of the
corporation, and that allow different companies to adopt different governance
rules. Nevertheless, it is clear that increased shareholder activism and the
resulting increase in shareholder power has affected the relationship between
boards and shareholders, and it is equally clear that the MBCA must remain
flexible enough to grapple with the negative and positive repercussions of that
effect. However, when contemplating the next sixty years, the most important

62. See 2010 Proxy Season Watchlist of Key Shareholder Proposals, RISKMETRICS GROUP (April
8, 2010), http://www.riskmetrics.com/knowledge/proxy_season_watchlist_2010 (demonstrating that
there were more proposals on special meetings than any type of other proposal submitted).
63. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 13, at 1255.
64. See Committee Amendments on Voting, supra note 59, at 2.
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changes to the MBCA may be those highlighting the notion that although the
corporate-governance climate may change, the basic duties of directors and
officers, as well as the core purpose of the corporation, remain the same.

